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LIBERALISM,
HUMAN RIGHTS,AND
HUMAN DIGNITY

Do internationalstandards regardinghuman rights require the
existenceof a liberalregime?Thiswas the thrustof RhodaHowardand JackDonnelly's
essay in the September1986 issue of this Review. Neil Mitchelltakesvigorous issuewith
this contention,arguingfirst and foremost that Howardand Donnelly have not defined
liberalismsatisfactorily.Howard and Donnelly presenta spiritedrejoinder.
In "HumanDignity,
Human Rights, and Political Regimes"
(this Review, September 1986), Rhoda
Howard and Jack Donnelly argue that
humanrightsrequireliberalism:"Wecontend that internationally recognized
humanrightsrequirea liberalregime"(p.
802). This contention is supportedby a
very abstractdefinition of liberalism,by
inappropriatecomparisons,by neglecting
other ideological traditionsthat can also
claim to support human rights and the
integrity of individuals, and by ignoring
consideration of other conditions that
may be necessaryfor human rights.
Howard and Donnelly's definition of
liberalismis tied to no particulartheorist,
century, or country, making it easier to
producea set of valueswith an article-byarticle correspondenceto the Universal
Declarationof HumanRights.The definition is variously defended as an "ideal
type," as "a plausiblestandardreadingof
the liberaltradition,"and finally with the
revealing comment, "Our subject in this
articleis humanrights,not liberalism"(p.
802). Their subject needs be both if they
are to make their argument effectively.
Simplystipulatinga set of values and calling themliberalismand then showing that
these values are compatiblewith a conception of human rights is not a compellingmethodof argument.One could as
easily stipulate a floating*pastiche of

"socialist"values, affiliated neither with
Marx nor with Tawney, groundedon no
particularpiece of history or society, but
which also fits human rights. Without a
more carefulexplicationof liberalism,the
connection Howard and Donnelly assert
raisesall sorts of objections.Whatwe end
up with is a philosophicalhybrid that no
one will claim but that is apparently
created by crossing John Locke with
Edward Kennedy, perhaps in the cosy
confines of a British welfare state that
works, presumably after having first
detachedNorthernIreland.
Thus, we have emphasis on the prepolitical rights of individuals that one
finds in the Two Treatises,without the
more awkward bits like the limiting of
governmentto the protectionof property.
Insteadwe are told that liberalismmeans
that government is required "to cancel
unjustifiable market inequalities" and
ensurea decentstandardof life for all-so
bringingit into line with Articles 22 and
25 of the universal declaration. The
familiar liberal theme, going back to
Locke's peculiar "title" to charity, and
often espoused by Thatcher or Reagan,
that these needs can be met privately is
not consideredby our authors.They even
extendtheirargumentto includea rightto
work (Article 23)-not simply the more
recognizableliberal position of a chance
to work-which they derive from the
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liberal principle of "equal concern and
respect." One wonders why they stop
here-why not also derive equality of
condition from this principle?They do
say that "a certain amount of economic
liberty is also required"to "reflectfree
decisions based on personal values that
arise from autonomouslychosen conceptions of the good life" (p. 803), so rather
than deriveabsoluteequality, perhapswe
should stop at the well-known liberal
slogan "to each accordingto his need"!
This argument that liberalism is not
only fully consonantwith civil and political rights but also with economic and
social rights crystallizes in the contrast
made betweenliberalismand the minimal
state. The minimalstate which elsewhere
one sometimes hears described as "classical liberalism,"is for Howardand Donnelly not liberalismbecause "in its very
essence [it] is a violator of human rights"
(p. 807). But theirargumentdoes not rest
on circularityalone; the authors add to
this their uncertaintyas to whetherminimalism is logically consistent: "Beyond
minimalism's obvious incompatibility
with internationalhumanrightsstandards
V . . its deep commitment to protecting
private property while denying all other
economic and social rights borders on
logical contradiction" (p. 807). While
hedging with the word "borders,"
Howard and Donnelly say that unlimited
accumulation (which one finds in the
scholarly interpretation of the Two
Treatisesincidentally)cannot be justified
in termsof "enjoymentof personalautonomy" (p. 807). For "at a certain point,
additionaleconomic resourcescontribute
nothing at all to personalautonomy"(p.
807). Who is to determinethis point without infringingon the other liberalprinciple that they assert of "one citizen'sconceptionof the good life being no nobleror
superiorto another's"(p. 803) is not made
clear, and the othergroundsfor unlimited
accumulation-found in Locke,for example-are not considered. Further, it is

argued that the minimal state is "selfdestructingif it recognizesequal, universal civil and politicalrights"(p. 807). People will use theirpoliticalrightsto destroy
minimalism and institute welfare states.
But, of course, thereis no generalrequirement that I am aware of that value
systems, traditions, or regimes be internally consistent; they may even contain
within them the "seeds of their own
destruction."Howard and Donnelly hold
the convictionthat Sir IsaiahBerlinwarns
against in "Two Concepts of Liberty,"
namely, "that all the positive values in
which men have believed must, in the
end, be compatible, and perhaps even
entail one another" (1970, 167). In any
case the ideal of a minimal state is electorally popular at the moment, as the
elections and reelectionsof Thatcherand
Reagan illustrate. The point is that the
minimalstate is not compatiblewith some
articles of the universal declaration, as
Howard and Donnelly recognize, but
theirclaim, which is presumablyessential
to their thesis, that it is somehow a less
"pure"form of liberalismis not convincing, given the argumentspresented.Without clearly specifyingthe origins of liberalism, then, one is left with the suspicion
that the method of constructing the
"plausiblestandardreadingof the liberal
tradition" is to first read the universal
declarationand then pick, choose, derive,
and discardas necessary.
The authors contrast liberalism with
what they call communitarianregimes
"thatgive ideologicaland practicalpriority to the community . . . over the individual" (p. 808). One type of communitarian regime is communism. Their
abstract, or "pure,"definition of liberalism is inappropriatelycomparedto a concept of communismbased on "the structure and official ideology of contemporarycommunistsocieties"(p. 809). Not
surprisingly,communismis found to fall
short of human-rights standards-as
would liberalismif it was constitutedin a
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similar way by, say, the McCarranWalterAct, the Diplock courts of Northern Ireland,and so on.
In communist societies, we are told,
"one is equal not by birth or by nature,
but only to the extent that one is essentially indistinguishablefrom one's fellow
communist citizens" (p. 810). Communism, then for Howard and Donnelly,
is Orwell's satire or "the dark night of
totalitarianismin which all cats are grey."
They go on to claim that communismis
even incompatible with economic and
social rightsbecausetheserightsare "contingent on the dischargeof social duties"
(p. 810). This argumentseems to forget
that civil and political rights, even in
liberaltheory (let alone practice),are contingent. With John Stuart Mill, freedom
of opinion is contingent on not harming
others or not instigating"somemischievous act"-corn dealers starve the poor.
With JohnLocke, tolerationis contingent
on loyalty (not to be extendedto Catholics, for example,in his day). And in practice, of course, foreign "communists"are
denied entry to the United States, and
domestic communists are off and on
denied free speech for national-security
reasons. In short, the good of the communityin liberalismalso takesprecedence
over individual rights. What makes
Howard and Donnelly's argument here
extraordinaryis that the penultimatearticle of the UniversalDeclarationof Human
Rights,which they say they "acceptwithout argument,"explicitly recognizes the
importanceof "dischargingsocial duties"
and the contingency of individual rights
on these duties, despite their claim to the
contrary (p. 806).
Now to move from what is includedto
what is omitted; Howard and Donnelly,
in assertingthat human rights require a
particulartype of liberal regime, ignore
other traditions and value systems that
condemn torture and political repression
and provide for economic and social
security. Most obvious, of course, is
923

Marxism,not as caricaturedin the Soviet
constitution or Soviet practice but that
form of Marxism that provides the
analysis of the Paris Commune or looks
forward to "an association, in which the
free developmentof each is the condition
for the free developmentof all."We could
also look at the socialism of R. H.
Tawney, George Orwell, BernardCrick,
or the Swedish Social Democratsfor that
matter. Liberalism,then, even when it is
defined as it is in this article, does not
have exclusive claim to values that support human rights. There are alternative
traditions and regimes, and thus liberalism cannot be said to be a "requirement"
for human rights.
Finally,one is left puzzledby the wider
purpose or use of the argument of
Howard and Donnelly. It is remarkably
barren in terms of producing empirical
expectations about the variation in
human-rightsviolations cross-nationally,
except for the unexcitingpropositionthat
liberal societies will do better than other
societies of the world, which, right-wing
or left-wing, communist or corporatist,
presumablydo more or less equallybadly.
At least with Jeane Kirkpatrick,whose
work develops some similar themes, we
are provided with distinctions in terms
of human rights performance in "nondemocratic"countriesthat are empirically
testable. And while the comparatively
good performance-though only in terms
of civil and political rights-of liberal
regimesis plausibly attributedto values,
no consideration is given to alternative
explanationsor other conditions, like the
presenceof a marketeconomy or the generally superior material well-being that
one also finds in these societies. Nor
is any explanation provided for why
human-rightsviolations still occur within
these societies."Is it the result of the inadequate diffusion of liberal values? But
we are never even told who should hold
thesevalues: the people, policymakers,or
both. Nor are we told why thesesocieties,
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in their foreign policies, can consistently
support hideous client regimesif there is
such a "deepand essentialtheoreticalconnection"between humanrights and liberalism. Whateverthe article'spurpose, the
reasonfor this commentis the worry that
in such an importantand politicallysensitive area this article,perhapsinadvertently, contributes to what our profession
should be dedicated to fight-ethnocentrism.

ing more like a world of "to each according to his need" than Engels'saccount of
early industrial Manchester. This has
been precisely the direction of development of the liberal tradition, both in
theory and in practice, over the last century. Our ideal type was intended to fit
this real and concretely embodied tradition, rather than to maintain an anachronistic fidelity to Locke, as Mitchell
would apparentlyhave us do. We see no
NEILMITCHELL
reason why liberals must accept every
opinion of Locke-for example, nonUniversityof New Mexico
tolerationof Catholics-as dogma. Locke
was certainlyan importantsource of the
liberal tradition, but he did not engrave
Neil Mitchell'smajor concern appears the completetenets of liberalismin stone.
to be our definitionof liberalism,particu- We can see no reasonwhy liberalsshould
larly that a liberal regimein our concep- be requiredto wear the cementboots of a
tion looks like a Europeanwelfare state three-hundred-year-old
book of 243 numrather than the world of Locke, or the bered paragraphs.Mitchell'sreferenceto
robber barons, or the United States in
Mill, moreover,seems a non sequitur;we
1987. This results,he claims,from the fact
can recallno defenseof naturalor human
that it is "tied to no particulartheorist, rights in any of Mill's major political or
century, or country."Even more serious- moral works.
It is true that we provided a country
ly, he charges that it "is a philosophical
referent for communist states, namely
hybridthatno one will claim"and thathis
Soviet-bloc countries,but not for liberal.
suspiciono"is that our procedurewas "to
first read the universal declaration and
We agreethat we ought to have provided
then pick, choose, derive, and discardas
such a referent, as Mitchell appears,
necessary."
especially in his statement that "these
In "Human Dignity, Human Rights,
[liberal]societies in their foreign policies
and Political Regimes,"we directly and
can consistently support hideous client
explicitly (pp. 802-3) tie our conception regimes,"to think that our implicitreferof liberalism to the work of Ronald ent is the United States. It is not. We are
perfectly prepared to entertain the
Dworkin, which stands firmly within a
hypothesis that the United States more
well-recognizedtheoreticaltraditionrunning back to Locke, through Paine. The
closely approximatesa minimal than a
liberalstate (andnot merelybecauseminiimplicit empirical referent for our ideal
type is the modern liberal-democratic malism is currently"electorallypopular"
welfare state, particularlyin its European under Reagan). A society that has the
material capacity to provide universal
social-democraticform. We connect the
socialismof Tawney, Orwell, Crick, and
health care or universalmaternalbenefits
the SwedishSocialDemocratswith liberal but neverthelesschooses not to does not
social democracy. In other words, we
strike us as one based on equal concern
explicitly argue for both the theoretical and respect for all its citizens (see Goldcogency and historical pedigree of our
stein, N.d.). The U.S. government'slack
conceptionof liberalism.
of respect for its citizens can perhaps
explain why it supports hideous client
Of course,liberalismthusendsup look924
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to. An ideal type of communist regime
derived from Marx, rather than from
Leninor via Soviet practice,eitheris likely to look very muchlike our social democratic liberalism, or will have few or no
empiricalreferents.We should also note
that while Mitchellmay find it unsurprising that communisma la the Soviet Union
falls short of internationalhuman-rights
standards,such a view is very controversial, as several works cited in our article
indicate. Furthermore,we want to stress
that Soviet human-rightsshortcomingsdo
not arisemerelybecausethat countryhas
deviated from the "true"path of socialism. Theoreticalconceptssuch as the dictatorshipof the proletariatdemanddenial
of human rights.
Mitchell finds particularly "curious"
our argument that economic benefits in
communist regimes are not enjoyed as
human rights. He appearsto believe that
having the substanceof a right, for example, having access to health care, is
synonymous with having a claim against
the state to provide it. We agreethat having the substanceis betterthan nothingat
all, but it is a privilege (subjectto arbitrary state removal without any kind of
redress, even in principle or law) rather
than a right. In communist regimes, all
rights are contingentgrants of the state,
ratherthan entitlementsone has simply as
a humanbeing. This difference,enshrined
in practice and even in the Soviet constitution, is of monumental theoretical
and empiricalimportance.Mitchellclaims
however that Article 29 of the universal
declarationsupports the Soviet constitution by stating that the enjoyment of
human rights is contingent on the dischargeof social duties. It does not; rather
it holds that "everyonehas duties to the
community in which alone the free and
full developmentof his personalityis possible,"and that the only legitimatereason
to limit an individual'srights and freedoms is to secure "due recognition and
respect for the rights and freedoms of

regimes such as Chile and Guatemala,
whereasNorway, for example,extendsits
foreign aid to such countriesas Mozambique and Nicaragua (Skalnes and
Egeland1986).
Thus, we proposed an ideal type of
rights-protectingregime,which resembles
Europeansocial democracyand which we
called liberalism. But suppose we are
wrong and this regime should not be
called liberal. Let's call it x instead. Our
argumentremainsthe same: international
human-rights standards require an x
regime.
Mitchellprofessesto be "puzzledby the
wider purposeor use of this article."This
is perhapsbecause he entirely misses its
major, and quite explicit, analyticalpurpose, namely, to distinguish between
societies based on human rights and
societies with alternative-non-rightsbased-conceptions of human dignity.
We do not argue that the only valuable
way to preservehumandignityis through
human rights; we merely argue that it is
one way, and a particularlyuseful one in
a world of state societies(p. 803). Mitchell
could have challenged our definition of
humanrightsas "entitlementsthat ground
particularlypowerful claims against the
state, that each person has simply as a
human being" (p. 802). Had he rejected
our definition of rights and proposed
another,he mighthave been able to show
that x is not the only rights-protecting
regime and substantiatedhis claim that
there are "alternative traditions and
regimes"that support human rights. But
as he does not make any such argument,
we can find no reason to alter our views.
Mitchell also claims that we are guilty
of "inappropriatecomparisons,"particularly in our account of communism,
which we based on contemporarytheoretical works from, as well as observed
practice in, Soviet-bloc countries. For
neitherliberalismnor communismdo we
rely on the originalclassics,neitherLocke
nor Marx, as Mitchellappearsto wish us
925
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others."While in the Soviet constitution
rights are contingenton the fulfillmentof
duties, no such contingencyis providedin
the universaldeclaration.
There are also three minor points to
which we would like to respond. First,
Mitchell takes issue with our description
of minimalismas internallyinconsistent.
We readily agree that a political regime
can quite comfortablyadhereto an inconsistent set of political principles. But we
do believe that a fundamental internal
inconsistency(and one that reflectsa clear
class bias) is enough to remove minimalism from consideration as a plausible
regime for those concernedwith human
rights.
Secondly, he claims that we do not
clearly specify the origin of liberalism.
But we did state as brieflyas we could the
generally accepted proposition (with
which we expecthe would agree)that liberalismarose with the creationof modem
capitalistsociety, especiallywith the rise
of the bourgeois class (p. 804). We agree
that we did not explain, in this particular
short article, why liberal regimes still
violate so many rights.
Thirdly,Mitchellclaimsthat our article
is "remarkablybarrenin termsof producing empirical expectations about the
variations of human-rights violations
cross-nationally,"and he states that we
"presumably"believe that all nonliberal
regimes perform "more or less equally
badly." This is simply wrong. In the last
half of our article, we explicitly differentiate among various nonliberal regimes.
We do, in fact, provide some empirical
expectations about human-rights performances. We think that traditional,
communist, and perhapsdevelopmental,
regimesare more likely to provide for the
substance of social and economic rights
than minimalistor corporatistones; and
we also think that communistand developmentalist regimes are more likely to
value equality than minimalist, traditional, or corporatist societies. From a
moral point of view, we think equalityis

better than hierarchy, and the substance
of social and economic rights is better
than nothing at all, even if the regime
holding these ideals is not rights based.
Thuswerewe, for example,to be advising
a U.S. president on foreign policy in
Central America, we would advise supporting Nicaraguaover Guatemalaor El
Salvador, in contrast, for example, to
Jeane Kirkpatrick's (1979) minimalist
preferencesFinally, there is the charge of ethnocentrism,which Mitchellputs in a rather
condescendingfashion. As it comes out of
the blue without any explanation,we can
only ask, What is ethnocentricabout taking a standardthat is reflectedlegally in a
universal document to which practically
all states now pay at least lip service and
that applies to everybody in an entirely
universalisticfashion?Certainly,Mitchell
does not appearto want to arguethat any
of the regimeswe criticizerespectshuman
rights. Nor do we imagine that he wants
to argue that simply because someone
lives in a Third World Nation his or her
government should be held to lower
standards.
To insist on the universalrelevanceof
international human-rightsstandards is
not ethnocentrism.Rather, it is to insist
on the liberating power, in a world of
state societies, of the idea of human
rights. And it is to refuse to agree that
anythinggoes, that whatevera dictatoror
ruling class (of whatever ideological
stripe) calls respect for human rights is
such respect. Like so many others,
Mitchell,out of a misplacedfear of ethnocentrism,would leave us unableto charge
tyrants, despots, and oppressive ruling
classes with violating human rights. A
centralobjectiveof our articlewas to help
lay to rest this all-too-familiarerosion of
the idea of human rights.
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Notes
Neil Mitchell thanks James McCormick of Iowa
State University and Karen Remmer of the University of New Mexico for their comments.
1. For Justice Thurgood Marshall, liberal documerntsand regimes seem to provide scant protection
from repression. He said in 1978, "During most of
the past two hundred years, the Constitution as
interpreted by this court did not prohibit the most
ingenious and pervasive forms of discrimination
against the Negro" (McCluskey, 1986).
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